Chandigarh Mayor Election and the Supreme Court's invocation of Art. 142- A short note

Completeness of justice requires the Court to consider everything placed on record to give the most meaningful relief to the aggrieved party. This is exactly what has been done in this case.

The Supreme Court judgment in the Chandigarh mayor election issue has now been published. It can be accessed here (Record of Proceedings can be accessed here). We acted for the Petitioner in this case, who was declared as the rightful mayor of the Corporation by a 3-judge bench led by the CJI.

Merits aside, the exemplary exercise of powers under Art. 142 by the Court in itself constitutes a significant constitutional law precedent. ‘Complete justice’ under Art. 142 has conventionally been seen as a tool to fill statutory gaps; as such, the powers of the Court are understood to be circumscribed by statutory law and procedure.

This reading of Art. 142, however, also impairs the Court’s ability to do equitable justice in cases which cry for equity and wholesale intervention. This was one such case.

Having established that the 8 ‘invalid’ votes were, in fact, valid (as there was no defacement other than the Presiding Authority’s deliberate marks), the Court
did not order a recounting of votes; instead, it covered the whole nine yards to declare the rightful candidate as the winner.

In doing so, the Court did not wait for formal law to take its course- it went all the way to take the electoral process to its logical end, as would have been the case but for the unfortunate malpractice. In para 37 of the judgment, the Court observes thus:

37. We are of the considered view that in such a case, this Court is duty-bound, particularly in the context of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, to do complete justice to ensure that the process of electoral democracy is not allowed to be thwarted by such subterfuges. Allowing such a state of affairs to take place would be destructive of the most valued principles on which the entire edifice of democracy in our country depends. We are, therefore, of the view that this Court must step in in such an exceptional situation to ensure that the basic mandate of electoral democracy at the local participatory level is preserved. Pertinently, this is not an ordinary case of alleged malpractice by candidates in an election, but electoral misconduct by the presiding officer himself. The brazen nature of the malpractice, visible on camera, makes the situation all the more extraordinary, justifying the invocation of the power of this Court under Article 142.

Completeness of justice requires the Court to consider everything placed on record to give the most meaningful relief to the aggrieved party. This is exactly what has been done here. The judgment will occupy its rightful place in our election law jurisprudence.